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Aboriginal Rights and the
Honour of the Crown
Brian Slattery*
I. INTRODUCTION
When the Supreme Court first grasped the nettle of section 351 of
the Constitution Act, 1982 in the Sparrow case, it held that the constitutional affirmation of Aboriginal rights should be interpreted in the light
of the fundamental principle of the honour of the Crown. This principle
pointed simultaneously in two different but complementary directions:
negotiation and litigation. With respect to the first, the Court noted that
the section provided a solid constitutional base for negotiated treaties
between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown that would represent a just
settlement of their claims. With respect to litigation, the Court held that
the section furnished Aboriginal rights with a judicial shield against
legislative infringement and limitation, except where the latter could be
justified under the “high standard of honourable dealing” demanded of
the Crown.2
While the Supreme Court has continued to emphasize the need for
negotiated settlements of Aboriginal claims, most of its efforts in subsequent cases have been directed at delineating the scope of section 35’s
judicial protection and identifying the legal criteria for recognizing
Aboriginal rights. Over the past two decades, the Court has made great
strides in the latter areas. However, until recently it has left largely unexplored the section’s role as a basis for negotiated settlement.
This emphasis has tacitly encouraged the view that section 35 embodies a relatively static constitutional order, which mandates courts to
identify a range of specific Aboriginal rights by applying general legal
criteria to particular historical circumstances. However, this paradigm
*

Osgoode Hall Law School.
Part II of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter the “Charter”].
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R. v. Sparrow, [1990] S.C.J. No. 49, at paras. 52-63, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, at 1105-09.
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needs revision after the Haida Nation3 and Taku River4 decisions, both
written by McLachlin C.J. for a unanimous Supreme Court. In these
cases, the Court portrays the fundamental law governing Aboriginal
rights as more dynamic than static — mandating a process that involves
the active participation of indigenous peoples and the Crown in the
identification of Aboriginal rights. In effect, the Court views section 35
as a generative constitutional order. Let me explain.

II. THE STANDARD PARADIGM
According to the dominant viewpoint, the Crown’s acquisition of
sovereignty over indigenous peoples and their territories gave rise to
Aboriginal rights in the common law of Canada. These rights continue
to exist in their original form unless or until extinguished by legislation,
voluntary surrender or other valid process. As legal rights, Aboriginal
rights are cognizable and enforceable in Canadian courts. However,
Aboriginal peoples have to prove the existence of these rights on a caseby-case basis in order to gain judicial protection.
While this paradigm represents a clear advance over the paradigm of
non-recognition that tended to dominate Canadian jurisprudence in
earlier days, it has several drawbacks. These relate to three areas: (1)
Crown sovereignty; (2) proof of Aboriginal rights; and (3) the potential
for evolution. I will say a few words about each.
1. Crown Sovereignty
Prior to Haida Nation, the Supreme Court generally took the view
that the existence of Crown sovereignty over indigenous peoples was
legally unassailable. As the Court stated in the Sparrow case:
It is worth recalling that while British policy towards the native
population was based on respect for their right to occupy their
traditional lands, a proposition to which the Royal Proclamation of
1763 bears witness, there was from the outset never any doubt that

3

Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] S.C.J. No. 70, [2004] 3
S.C.R. 511.
4
Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director),
[2004] S.C.J. No. 69, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 550.
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sovereignty and legislative power, and indeed the underlying title, to
such lands vested in the Crown; ...5

Yet many indigenous people take the view that the Crown’s acquisition
of control over their territories was an illegitimate act, consummated
without their consent. This illegitimacy was compounded by the ensuing
acts of dispossession, segregation and disenfranchisement visited on
many Aboriginal groups by the Crown. Some deny outright that the
Crown ever gained lawful sovereignty over them, arguing that they were
never conquered by the Crown and never voluntarily ceded their territories to the Crown or accepted its claims of authority. Others point to
ancient treaties as the basis of their relationship with the Crown, as
friends and allies rather than subjects. Still others say that the Crown
stands as the protector of their rights rather than as a “sovereign” on the
European model. In one way or another, then, Crown sovereignty has
always been a sticking point for Aboriginal peoples — even when presented as part and parcel of the common law doctrine of Aboriginal
rights.
2. Proof of Aboriginal Rights
Under the dominant paradigm, if the Crown disputes the existence
of Aboriginal rights claimed by an indigenous group, the group bears
the burden of proving the existence of these rights in court. This process
is usually extremely time-consuming and costly and in the end may fail
to yield an effective remedy. It also means that, absent a definitive court
ruling, Aboriginal peoples are not in a strong position to protect their
rights from invasion or impairment, so that the existence of Aboriginal
rights is often more theoretical than real. To many indigenous peoples, it
seems paradoxical that they should be put to the task of proving their
rights in the courts, when they are the original inhabitants of this land.
3. The Potential for Evolution
The standard paradigm holds that, once Aboriginal rights are proven
to have existed at the critical historical date (often centuries ago), they
continue to exist more or less in their original form, with only a modest
5

Supra, note 2, at 1103, para. 49.
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allowance for evolution and change. This approach does not allow
courts to take proper account of the tremendous changes that have occurred in Canadian society in the interval. It mandates the recognition of
Aboriginal rights in historical configurations that are often ill-adapted to
contemporary conditions. At the same time, it does not permit courts to
consider the interests of third parties and the larger society in moulding
the modern contours of Aboriginal rights.
So courts are forced to make hard and somewhat unrealistic choices.
Either they must hold that the asserted Aboriginal rights continue to
exist in their original historical forms, which may satisfy neither the
Aboriginal claimants nor third-party stakeholders. Or they must hold
that the rights have been extinguished, which often compounds the injustices already experienced by the indigenous parties and fails to resolve the long-standing grievances that separate them from their
neighbours. In other words, the paradigm does not lend itself to a flexible approach which permits Aboriginal rights to be recognized in a form
that makes allowance for the current and future needs of Aboriginal
peoples and the reasonable interests of the larger society.

III. THE NEW PARADIGM
In the Haida Nation and Taku River decisions, we witness the
emergence of a new constitutional paradigm governing Aboriginal
rights. This paradigm recognizes the potential of section 35 as a generative constitutional order — one that mandates the Crown to negotiate
with Aboriginal peoples for the recognition of their rights in a contemporary form that balances their needs with the interests of the broader
society.
According to this approach, when the Crown claimed sovereignty
over Canadian territories and ultimately gained factual control over
them, it did so in the face of pre-existing Aboriginal sovereignty and
territorial rights. The tension between these conflicting claims gave rise
to a special relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples,
which requires the Crown to deal honourably with Aboriginal peoples.
The “honour of the Crown” obliges the Crown to respect Aboriginal
rights, which in turn requires it to negotiate with Aboriginal peoples
with a view to identifying those rights. It also obliges the Crown to
consult with Aboriginal peoples in all cases where its activities affect
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their asserted rights and, where appropriate, to accommodate these
rights by adjusting the activities.6
The Court’s overall approach is outlined by McLachlin C.J. in a
pithy paragraph:
Put simply, Canada's Aboriginal peoples were here when
Europeans came, and were never conquered. Many bands reconciled
their claims with the sovereignty of the Crown through negotiated
treaties. Others, notably in British Columbia, have yet to do so. The
potential rights embedded in these claims are protected by s. 35 of the
Constitution Act, 1982. The honour of the Crown requires that these
rights be determined, recognized and respected. This, in turn, requires
the Crown, acting honourably, to participate in processes of
negotiation. While this process continues, the honour of the Crown
may require it to consult and, where indicated, accommodate
Aboriginal interests.7

This new approach attempts to remedy some of the main drawbacks
of the standard paradigm. Let us review the three areas of difficulty
identified earlier.
1. Crown Sovereignty
In Haida Nation and Taku River, the Supreme Court is careful to
avoid suggesting that the Crown gained sovereignty over Aboriginal
peoples in a lawful or legitimate manner. The Court speaks of the
Crown’s assertion of sovereignty, as opposed to its acquisition of sovereignty, and it notes that this assertion effectively collided with the preexisting sovereignty and territorial rights of indigenous peoples. The
Court acknowledges that the Crown ultimately gained factual control of
the territories claimed — what it describes as de facto sovereignty. But
it pointedly refrains from concluding that this sovereignty is de jure.
The term de facto characterizes a state of affairs that is illegal or illegitimate but accepted for practical purposes. It contrasts with the term
de jure, which means rightful, legitimate, just, or constitutional, and
generally describes a condition in which there has been full compliance

6
7

Haida Nation, supra, note 3, at para. 32; Taku River, supra, note 4, at para. 24.
Haida Nation, supra, note 3, at para. 25.
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with all legal requirements.8 Overall, the Court’s choice of language
suggests that the Crown’s claims of sovereignty over Aboriginal peoples
will continue to be legally deficient until there has been a just settlement
of their rights through negotiated treaties. As McLachlin C.J. says:
Treaties serve to reconcile pre-existing Aboriginal sovereignty with
assumed Crown sovereignty, and to define Aboriginal rights
guaranteed by s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Section 35
represents a promise of rights recognition, and “[i]t is always assumed
that the Crown intends to fulfil its promises” ... . This promise is
realized and sovereignty claims reconciled through the process of
honourable negotiation.9

2. Proof of Aboriginal Rights
The judgment in Haida Nation opens by observing that the Queen
Charlotte Islands are the “traditional homelands” of the Haida people
and that from time immemorial the cedar forests of the Islands have
played a central role in the culture and economy of the Haida people.10
In a sense, the rest of the judgment represents a sustained deliberation
on the significance of this observation. For it is the fundamental fact that
indigenous peoples were the original inhabitants of Canada that puts
Aboriginal claims on a different footing than the normal range of claims
that come before the courts.
The Court holds that, where the Crown disputes the existence or
scope of Aboriginal rights claimed by an indigenous group, the group
does not have to prove the existence of the rights in court in order to
protect them from invasion or impairment. The Crown has the duty to
consult with indigenous peoples regarding their asserted rights, and in
certain cases to accommodate them, even in the absence of definitive
proof that the rights exist.
But when does the duty to consult arise, if not on proof of the asserted Aboriginal right? Is the mere assertion of the right enough to
trigger the duty? Chief Justice McLachlin replies that the duty arises
when two conditions are fulfilled: (1) the Crown has knowledge, real or
8
9
10

Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th ed. (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1979), at 375 and 382.
Haida Nation, supra, note 3, at para. 20.
Id., at paras. 1-2.
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constructive, of the potential existence of the Aboriginal right; and (2) it
contemplates conduct that might adversely affect the right.11
Of course this pushes the question back a stage. For, as the Chief
Justice acknowledges, it can fairly be asked how the Crown can be said
to have knowledge of an Aboriginal right when the existence of the right
has not been demonstrated. This question evidently taxed the Chief
Justice somewhat, because she refers back to her dissenting opinion in
the Marshall case, where she maintained that one cannot “meaningfully
discuss accommodation or justification of a right unless one has some
idea of the core of that right and its modern scope.”12 While giving that
argument its due, the Chief Justice points out that it is often possible to
gain a sufficient idea of the asserted right and its strength to trigger an
obligation to consult and accommodate, even in the absence of a final
judicial determination. To facilitate this process, she urges Aboriginal
claimants to outline their claims with clarity, focusing on the scope and
nature of the asserted right and infringement.13 She goes on to explain
that the duty to consult and accommodate operates on a sliding scale,
varying in scope and intensity depending on a preliminary assessment of
the strength of the case supporting the existence of the right and the
seriousness of the potential adverse effects on the right.14
How satisfactory is the answer that the Chief Justice gives to the objection she voiced in Marshall? I suggest that her approach makes sense
in light of the view that the specific Aboriginal rights asserted by particular indigenous groups are instantiations of a panoply of presumptive
generic rights arising from the great encounter between Aboriginal
peoples and the Crown.15 In other words, Aboriginal rights do not proceed ex nihilo, like rabbits out of hats, in which case we might rightly
say that we believe it only when we see it. The honour of the Crown
supports a range of generic rights presumptively held by all Aboriginal
peoples. The specifics of these rights vary from group to group. But it
can safely be assumed that all Aboriginal groups hold these rights in one
form or another. For example, all Aboriginal peoples have a generic
11
12

Id., at para. 35.
Id., at para. 36, quoting R. v. Marshall, [1999] S.C.J. No. 55, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456, at

para. 112.
13

Haida Nation, supra, note 3, at para. 36.
Id., at para. 39.
15
For more on the distinction between generic and specific rights, see Slattery, “Making
Sense of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights” (2000) 79 Can. Bar Rev. 196, at 211-18.
14
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right to the exclusive use and occupation of an ancestral territory. Where
that territory is located and how much remains under Aboriginal title are
matters to be settled in each case. But it is the presumptive generic right
to an ancestral territory that gives the concrete land claim of an Aboriginal group its distinctive legal heft and credibility.
3. The Potential for Evolution
The Court emphasizes that the Crown has the duty to achieve a just
settlement of Aboriginal claims by negotiation and treaty. So doing, the
Court attributes a generative role to section 35. In effect, it holds that
the Crown, with the assistance of the courts, has the duty to bring into
being a new legal order that accommodates Aboriginal rights, through
negotiation and agreement with the indigenous peoples affected. This
approach views section 35 as serving a dynamic and not simply static
function — a function that does not come to an end even when treaties
are successfully negotiated. As the Supreme Court states:
The jurisprudence of this Court supports the view that the duty to
consult and accommodate is part of a process of fair dealing and
reconciliation that begins with the assertion of sovereignty and
continues beyond formal claims resolution. Reconciliation is not a
final legal remedy in the usual sense. Rather, it is a process flowing
from rights guaranteed by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.16

In other words, section 35 does not simply recognize a static body
of specific Aboriginal rights, whose contours may be ascertained by the
application of general legal criteria to historical circumstances — historical rights for short. Rather, the section binds the Crown to take positive steps to identify Aboriginal rights in a contemporary form, with the
consent of the indigenous parties concerned — what we may call settlement rights. Settlement rights have two distinctive characteristics, not
shared by historical rights. First, they represent contemporary restatements of Aboriginal rights in a form that renders them useful and commodious for indigenous groups in modern conditions. Second,
settlement rights perforce take account of the interests of the broader
society, of which Aboriginal peoples are also members.

16

Haida Nation, supra, note 3, at para. 32 (emphasis added).
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The Supreme Court evidently feels that the judicial branch should
concern itself primarily with the task of recognizing and protecting
historical rights and leave the task of identifying modern versions of
these rights to the executive branch, through the processes of negotiation and agreement with indigenous peoples. But it must be remembered
that, without the courts’ ability to shield historical rights from governmental intrusion, the chances of reaching agreement on settlement rights
would often be very slight indeed.
What then is the precise relationship between historical rights and
settlement rights? To put the question another way, what is the link
between: (1) Aboriginal rights identified by applying general legal criteria to particular historical circumstances (typically through litigation);
and (2) Aboriginal rights identified by balancing the contemporary
rights and interests of Aboriginal nations and those of the broader community (typically through negotiation)? The Court intimates that litigation and negotiation are both modes of reconciliation, while suggesting
that negotiation is the preferable way of reconciling state and Aboriginal
interests.17 But it does not attempt to explain the fact that two processes
are likely to yield quite different results in practice.
There are three ways of explaining the relationship between historical rights and settlement rights. The first argues that the two are actually
quite different sorts of rights, with distinct origins and content. Historical rights alone merit the appellation of Aboriginal rights, since they
alone are identified by reference to the ancestral customs and practices
of indigenous peoples. Settlement rights are not true Aboriginal rights.
In reality, they are simply consensual or contractual rights, grounded in
agreement between the parties. So, according to this view, when treaties
are negotiated, they typically replace the Aboriginal rights of the indigenous parties with settlement rights flowing from the agreement. We
may call this the contractual theory, because it posits a clean break
between historical rights and settlement rights.
This theory has some merits. It rightly points to the substantial differences that sometimes exist between historical rights and the rights
recognized in modern agreements. And it rightly emphasizes the consensual — and in that sense contractual — nature of such agreements.
However, it also has several difficulties. It does not correspond to the

17

Id., at para. 14.
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perspective of most indigenous peoples, who view treaties as modes of
articulating and protecting their basic rights rather than as simply creative enterprises, much less as vehicles of extinguishment. The theory
also ignores the fact that many treaties can hardly be understood without
reference to the historical Aboriginal rights that form their backdrop.
The second theory argues, to the contrary, that settlement rights are
modern incarnations of the historical rights held by Aboriginal peoples.
They represent an attempt to give Aboriginal rights a contemporary
form, one that adapts them to the current needs of Aboriginal peoples
and the larger society. So settlement rights are in a sense the modern
descendants of historical rights and bear a family resemblance to them.
We may call this the evolutionary theory, because it holds that historical
rights are the original prototypes and progenitors of settlement rights.
While closer to the truth than the first view, this position also has its
difficulties. In emphasizing the link between historical and settlement
rights, it downplays the often striking concrete differences between
them. How can rights that are so different in the flesh actually be said to
bear a family resemblance?
The third view represents an attempt to deal with this difficulty. It
calls in aid the distinction between generic Aboriginal rights and specific Aboriginal rights (mentioned earlier) and argues that generic rights
may take different concrete forms at different epochs. Historical rights
represent the specific forms that generic rights assumed at certain critical dates in the past, be it the time of European contact, the date of asserted Crown sovereignty, or the period of effective Crown control.18
But historical rights are not the only possible incarnations of generic
Aboriginal rights, which are grounded in the honour of the Crown and
remain, as it were, evergreen. Settlement rights represent the specific
form that generic Aboriginal rights take at the time a particular treaty is
concluded, as identified through a process of negotiation and agreement.19 But even treaties and agreements do not exhaust the creative
potential of generic rights, which remain a potent source of future generations of rights. We may call this the generative theory, because it
18
The Supreme Court has identified a variety of critical dates for different categories of
historical rights; see R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] S.C.J. No. 77, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507; Delgamuukw v.
British Columbia, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 and R. v. Powley, [2003] S.C.J. No.
43, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 207.
19
Of course, not all rights found in treaties are “settlement rights” in the sense used here;
some are simply the product of agreement.
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views Aboriginal rights as operating on two levels — the first, abstract
and timeless; the second, concrete and time-bound — with the first level
continuously regenerating and refreshing the second. This theory is the
most appealing of the three, because of its capacity to explain both the
underlying continuity of Aboriginal rights and their protean ability to
assume different concrete forms.

IV. THE SOURCE OF THE DUTY TO ACT HONOURABLY
As we have seen, the Supreme Court holds that the Crown has a
general duty to act honourably as regards indigenous peoples and their
rights. The Court refers to this as “the Crown’s duty of honourable dealing” or more briefly “the honour of the Crown.”20
But how did the Crown’s duty to act honourably arise? Here again
there are three theories. The first argues that the Crown voluntarily
assumed this duty when it asserted sovereignty over the indigenous
peoples of Canada. In effect, the duty arose from a freely undertaken
Crown Act. A plausible candidate is the Royal Proclamation of 1763,
where the Crown states:
... whereas it is just and reasonable, and essential to Our Interest and
the Security of Our Colonies, that the several Nations or Tribes of
Indians, with whom We are connected, and who live under Our
Protection, should not be molested or disturbed in the Possession of
such Parts of Our Dominions and Territories as, not having been ceded
to, or purchased by Us, are reserved to them, or any of them, as their
Hunting Grounds; ... 21

Advocates of this theory point to the Proclamation’s declaration that
Indian nations live under the Crown’s protection and argue that the
document’s detailed provisions are only partial articulations of the basic
responsibilities that the Crown assumed.
The second theory does not necessarily deny the far-reaching effects
of the Royal Proclamation of 1763, but it argues that the document only
gave voice to what was in reality a pre-existing legal duty or responsibility. This duty flowed from a general principle of imperial law that
20

Haida Nation, supra, note 3, at paras. 16 and 32; Taku River, supra, note 4, at para. 24.
Royal Proclamation of 7 October 1763, in Brigham, ed., British Royal Proclamations
Relating to America (Worcester, Massachusetts: American Antiquarian Society, 1911), at 212.
21
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governed the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty over indigenous peoples
and required the Crown to deal honourably with these peoples and respect their basic rights. So the Proclamation was, in this respect, not a
pure “act of grace” on the part of the Crown, but rather an explicit recognition of what was in fact its bounden legal duty.
The third theory takes an altogether different tack. It suggests that
the duty to act honourably stems from the explicit recognition and affirmation of Aboriginal rights in section 35 of the Constitution Act,
1982. As such the duty only came into existence at the time the section
was enacted in 1982 and presumably only governs Crown dealings from
that date onwards. Prior to this time, while specific fiduciary obligations
bound the Crown in particular contexts, the general duty to act honourably did not exist beyond the purely moral and political sphere.
Which of these theories does the Supreme Court favour in Haida
Nation? At least one thing is clear: the Court rejects the third theory.
Time and again it insists that the duty to act honourably governs all the
Crown’s dealings with Aboriginal peoples “from the assertion of sovereignty to the resolution of claims and the implementation of treaties.”22
The Court’s clearest statement on the point comes in its response to
the argument advanced by the Province of British Columbia that the
Crown’s duty to consult or accommodate rests solely with the federal
government. The province invoked section 109 of the Constitution Act,
1867,23 which provides that “[a]ll Lands, Mines, Minerals, and Royalties
belonging to the several Provinces of Canada . . . at the Union . . . shall
belong to the several Provinces.” The province argued that this provision gave it exclusive rights to the lands at issue. This right, it maintained, could not be limited by the protection for Aboriginal rights found
in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, for to do so would undermine the balance of federalism.24
The Supreme Court rejects this argument. It points out that, under
the terms of section 109, the provinces took their interest in lands subject to “any Interest other than that of the Province in the same.” It goes
on to hold that the duty to consult and accommodate “is grounded in the
assertion of Crown sovereignty which pre-dated the Union.” It follows
that the province took the lands subject to this duty. It cannot therefore
22
23

Haida Nation, supra, note 3, at para. 17; see also paras. 32, 53 and 59.
Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No.

5.
24

Haida Nation, supra, note 3, at paras. 57-58.
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argue that section 35 deprives it of powers it would otherwise have
enjoyed.25 So, the Court clearly rules out the view that the duty to act
honourably only came into existence in 1982, with the enactment of
section 35.
Elsewhere, the Court makes statements favouring the view that the
honour of the Crown flows from general principles of law applying at
the time of asserted sovereignty. In a passage noted earlier, Chief Justice
McLachlin C.J. says that the duty to consult and accommodate is part of
a process of fair dealing and reconciliation that begins with the assertion
of sovereignty and continues beyond formal claims resolution. She goes
on to state:
This process of reconciliation flows from the Crown’s duty of
honourable dealing toward Aboriginal peoples, which arises in turn
from the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty over an Aboriginal people
and de facto control of land and resources that were formerly in the
control of that people. As stated in Mitchell v. M.N.R., [2001] 1 S.C.R.
911, 2001 SCC 33, at para. 9, “[w]ith this assertion [sovereignty]
arose an obligation to treat Aboriginal peoples fairly and honourably,
and to protect them from exploitation.”26

This passage suggests that the duty of honourable dealing arose
automatically upon the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty over indigenous nations. The Court does not invoke any specific Crown acts, such
as the Royal Proclamation of 1763. Rather it portrays the duty as the
inevitable by-product of the process itself. No doubt the Court would
acknowledge that the Proclamation bears witness to the existence of the
duty, but evidently it rejects the view that the Proclamation (or any other
Crown Act) is its source.
What role, then, does section 35 play in implementing the honour of
the Crown? According to Haida Nation, the section has a dual function.
On the one hand, it serves as a basis for the judicial identification and
protection of historical Aboriginal rights, through the application of
general constitutional principles. On the other hand, it serves as a
springboard for negotiations leading to just settlements, in which Aboriginal rights are recognized in a modern form and reconciled with the
interests of the larger society. In both cases, the process is informed by
the honour of the Crown.
25
26

Id., at para. 59.
Id., at para. 32 (emphasis supplied in original).

